



**TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL**
the global coalition against corruption



CORRUPTIONS PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2025

Transparency International is a global movement with one vision: a world in which government, business, civil society and the daily lives of people are free of corruption. With more than 100 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, we are leading the fight against corruption to turn this vision into reality.

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
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182 COUNTRIES 182 SCORES


HOW DOES YOUR COUNTRY MEASURE UP?

The perceived levels of public sector corruption in 182 countries and territories around the world.

SCORE




**The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map follow the UN practice to the best of our knowledge and as of January 2026. They do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of Transparency International concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.*



SCORE COUNTRY/TERRITORY

89	Denmark	68	Barbados	56	Costa Rica	45	Benin
88	Finland	68	Seychelles	56	Grenada	45	Romania
84	Singapore	68	Taiwan	56	Portugal	45	Sao Tome and Principe
81	New Zealand	66	France	55	Cyprus	44	Jamaica
81	Norway	65	Lithuania	55	Fiji	44	Solomon Islands
80	Sweden	64	Bahamas	55	Spain	44	Timor-Leste
80	Switzerland	64	United States of America	53	Italy	43	China
78	Luxembourg	63	Brunei Darussalam	53	Poland	43	Cote d'Ivoire
78	Netherlands	63	Chile	52	Malaysia	43	Ghana
77	Germany	63	Korea, South	52	Oman	43	Kosovo
77	Iceland	63	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	50	Bahrain	42	Moldova
76	Australia	62	Cape Verde	50	Georgia	41	South Africa
76	Estonia	62	Israel	50	Greece	41	Trinidad and Tobago
76	Hong Kong	62	Dominica	50	Jordan	41	Vietnam
76	Ireland	60	Latvia	49	Malta	40	Bulgaria
75	Canada	60	Czechia	48	Mauritius	40	Burkina Faso
73	Uruguay	59	Saint Lucia	48	Slovakia	40	Cuba
71	Bhutan	59	Botswana	47	Croatia	40	Guyana
71	Japan	58	Qatar	47	Vanuatu	40	Hungary
70	United Kingdom	58	Rwanda	46	Armenia	40	North Macedonia
69	Austria	58	Slovenia	46	Kuwait	40	Tanzania
69	Belgium	58	Saudi Arabia	46	Montenegro	39	Albania
69	United Arab Emirates	57		46	Namibia	39	India
				46	Senegal		



39	Maldives	33	Ecuador	28	Pakistan	20	Cambodia
39	Morocco	33	Panama	27	Mexico	20	Comoros
39	Tunisia	33	Serbia	26	Cameroon	20	Democratic Republic of the Congo
38	Ethiopia	33	Thailand	26	Guatemala	19	Tajikistan
38	Kazakhstan	32	Angola	26	Guinea	17	Burundi
38	Suriname	32	El Salvador	26	Kyrgyzstan	17	Turkmenistan
37	Colombia	32	Philippines	26	Nigeria	16	Afghanistan
37	Dominican Republic	32	Togo	26	Papua New Guinea	16	Haiti
37	Gambia	31	Belarus	25	Madagascar	16	Myanmar
37	Lesotho	31	Djibouti	25	Uganda	15	Equatorial Guinea
37	Zambia	31	Mongolia	24	Bangladesh	15	Korea, North
36	Argentina	31	Niger	24	Central African Republic	15	Syria
36	Belize	31	Türkiye	24	Paraguay	14	Nicaragua
36	Ukraine	31	Uzbekistan	24	Congo	14	Sudan
35	Brazil	30	Azerbaijan	23	Eswatini	13	Eritrea
35	Sri Lanka	30	Egypt	23	Iran	13	Libya
34	Algeria	30	Kenya	23	Lebanon	13	Yemen
34	Bosnia and Herzegovina	30	Mauritania	22	Chad	10	Venezuela
34	Indonesia	30	Peru	22	Honduras	9	Somalia
34	Laos	29	Gabon	22	Russia	9	South Sudan
34	Malawi	28	Bolivia	22	Zimbabwe		
34	Nepal	28	Iraq	21	Guinea Bissau		
34	Sierra Leone	28	Liberia	21	Mozambique		
		28	Mali				

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The global order is under strain from rivalry between major powers, and dangerous disregard for international norms. Armed conflicts and the climate crisis are having a deadly impact. Societies are also becoming more polarised. To meet these challenges, the world needs principled leaders and strong, independent institutions that act with integrity to protect the public interest. Yet, too often, we are seeing a failure of good governance and accountable leadership.

In many places, leaders point to security, economic or geopolitical issues as reasons to centralise power, sideline checks and balances and roll back commitments to internationally agreed standards – including anti-corruption measures. Too often, they treat transparency, independent scrutiny and accountability to the public as optional.

The 2025 *Corruption Perceptions Index* (CPI) measures perceived levels of public-sector corruption in 182 countries and territories, drawing on 13 independent data sources and using a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). This year, the global CPI average has dropped for the first time in more than a decade to just 42 out of 100. The vast majority of countries are failing to keep corruption under control: 122 out of 182 score under 50 in the index. At the same time, the number of countries scoring above 80 has shrunk from 12 a decade ago to just five this year. In particular, there is a worrying trend of democracies seeing worsening perceived corruption – from the United States (64), Canada (75) and New Zealand (81), to various parts of Europe, like the United Kingdom (70), France (66) and Sweden (80).

Our research shows that corruption is not inevitable. Countries with long-term improvements in CPI scores have largely seen sustained effort from political leaders and regulators to implement broad legal and institutional reforms. Persistently low or declining CPI scores usually go hand in hand with limited or eroding democratic checks and balances, the politicisation of justice systems, undue influence over political processes, and a failure to safeguard civic space. It is not a surprise that countries with full democracies tend to score highly on the CPI, while non-democratic

GLOBAL AVERAGE


42/100

regimes largely perform the worst. In most of the world's full autocracies, such as Venezuela (10) and Azerbaijan (30), corruption is systemic and manifests at every level.

In almost two thirds of countries whose CPI scores have significantly declined since 2012, there has been a worrying pattern of restriction on freedoms of expression, association and assembly. In the last decade, politicised interference with the operations of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in countries such as Georgia (50),¹ Indonesia (34),² Peru (30)³ and Tunisia (39)⁴ has seen governments take actions such as introducing new laws to limit access to funding, or even disband organisations that scrutinise and criticise them. Such laws are often paired with smear campaigns and intimidation. In these contexts, it is harder for independent journalists, civil society organisations and whistleblowers to speak out against corruption freely. It is also more likely that corrupt officials can continue misusing their power.

AVERAGE CPI 2025 SCORE FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF GOVERNMENT*

Strong democracies control corruption far more effectively than flawed ones and authoritarian regimes.



*Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index and Transparency International's 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index.

The result is often poor-quality services and fiscal crises, as public funds are mismanaged, contributing to enduring poverty, rising inequality and worsening living standards for millions of people.

In 2025, we saw a surge of Gen-Z-led protests, as young people in countries that score poorly on the CPI – such as Serbia (33) and Peru (30) – took to the streets to demand action and accountability from their governments. In Nepal (34) and Madagascar (25), these popular protest movements brought down the governments of the day. Uniting these diverse groups of protestors was a sense that those in charge were abusing their power for their own interests, while failing to deliver decent public services, a stable economy and opportunity for everyone else.

Some powerful nations have an indirect impact on corruption levels that extends well beyond their borders. The Russian (22) state has been accused of interfering in other countries' elections by spreading disinformation and buying votes with the intention to influence voters and drive instability, democratic backsliding and narrowing of civic space. The US government decision to temporarily freeze and then degrade enforcement of its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act – a key anti-corruption law that prohibits corporate bribery of foreign officials – sends a dangerous signal that bribery and other corrupt practices are acceptable.⁵ At the same time, US aid cuts to funding for overseas civil society groups that scrutinise their governments has undermined anti-corruption efforts around the world. Political leaders in various countries have also taken this as a cue to further target and restrict independent voices, such as NGOs and journalists.⁶

From our research and on-the-ground experience as a global movement fighting corruption, we see there is a clear blueprint for how to hold power to account for the common good. Transparency International is calling on governments and leaders across the world to take action to strengthen justice systems, ensure independent oversight of decision making and public spending, guarantee transparency about how political parties and election campaigns are funded, and protect civic space, democracy and media freedom. At the same time, they should collaborate to tackle shared challenges – for example, closing the cross-border channels that enable transnational corruption, such as laundering and hiding stolen funds.

As we saw this year, governments who fail to address their citizens' concerns may find themselves toppled by popular protest movements. What's more, businesses may look elsewhere to invest, costing countries economic opportunities and jobs. By choosing to act for the public interest, not private gain, governments and leaders can live up to their responsibilities to shape and nurture safe, fair and healthy societies where everyone can thrive.

CROSS-BORDER CORRUPTION

This index focuses on perceptions of domestic public-sector corruption, including low-level administrative corruption. However, it is also important to highlight the role of the private sector in large-scale bribery and money laundering schemes, and the cross-border nature of such corruption. A key example is international flows of dirty money that leave large holes in countries' public spending budgets. Corrupt officials are often assisted by professional service providers to launder or safeguard illicit wealth in financial centres in countries that top the CPI, and these countries must do more to stop and ensure accountability for transnational corruption. They must also help remedy harm caused by corruption, including by enabling the return of assets to the societies they were stolen from.

“ At a time of climate crisis, instability and polarisation, the world needs accountable leaders and independent institutions to protect the public interest more than ever – yet, too often, they are falling short. We’re calling on governments and leaders to act with integrity and live up to their responsibilities to provide a better future for their citizens.

Maíra Martini

CEO, Transparency International



Photo: Transparency International

RECOMMENDATIONS



ENSURE INDEPENDENT, TRANSPARENT AND ACCESSIBLE JUSTICE INSTITUTIONS

In order to function properly, deter potential offenders and protect people who speak out against corruption, countries' justice systems must be shielded from interference by political or economic interests. This includes protecting appointments and promotions from external pressure. These systems also need to be properly resourced, prosecutorial decisions must be reasoned and reviewable, and courts should publish decisions and data.



TACKLE UNDUE INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL DECISION MAKING

Citizens deserve to know who funds political parties and candidates, or who influences decisions. It's important that political finance, conflicts of interest and lobbying are regulated, documented and subject to public scrutiny to ensure that democracy is protected against potential corruption. Transparency and limits on political donations stop rich and well-connected industry groups from being able to unfairly influence policies, budgets and public institutions to suit their own goals, rather than the public interest. This is vital to ensure that governments live up to their responsibility to design policies that protect societies and ensure healthy climate and ecosystems.




GIVE PEOPLE HARMED BY CORRUPTION ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Individuals and communities – not just states – harmed by corruption should have access to justice, either directly or through civil society organisations representing them. This is necessary to ensure remedy for damage caused by corruption, and it also serves as a backstop if law enforcement is not functioning properly. Marginalised communities, in particular, need tailored support and safeguards to ensure processes are inclusive for all.



FOSTER CIVIC SPACE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORTING

Fundamental freedoms – including a free press and the right to information – enable the active engagement of individuals and groups to promote transparency and integrity in government and business activities. Decision makers must fully protect civil society groups and people reporting corruption, such as whistleblowers. They should also create a regulatory framework that enables, rather than restricts, the work of civil society organisations – including to give them access to both domestic and international funding. This will strengthen the fight against corruption by allowing civic actors to expose abuse, assist victims, foster public participation and build accountability.



ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT IN PUBLIC SERVICES AND PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Fair and effective public services, such as health care and education, depend on those in charge of delivering them acting with integrity. Not only must everyone have access to these basic services, but there should also be robust checks on how public spending decisions are made, to ensure they truly represent the public interest. For this, it is essential that parliaments and other oversight institutions can scrutinise budgets and government borrowing, audit bodies can monitor how public money is spent, and regulators can uphold standards, including environmental ones. As part of this, institutions should also ensure that diverse groups of people are included in formal oversight mechanisms.



PREVENT, DETECT AND PUNISH LARGE-SCALE CORRUPTION AND ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS

Robust checks and balances at home, together with strong national and international prevention and detection measures, are essential to block and uncover large-scale, high-level corruption and major cross-border money laundering. To deter and punish these serious crimes, more effective enforcement systems are essential. Overcoming pervasive and deep-rooted state corruption will require strong national coalitions to rebuild democracy and rule of law. International enforcement in states with effective justice systems can also play a vital role by prosecuting wrongdoers and seizing stolen assets hidden abroad, to cut off their ability to operate.

“ In an interconnected world, we need both national action and multilateral cooperation to protect the public interest and tackle shared challenges like corruption. At a time when we’re seeing a dangerous disregard for international norms from some states, we need to protect a rules-based global order that is grounded in transparency, accountability to citizens and respect for human rights.

François Valérian
Chair, Transparency International



Photo: IACC

GLOBAL TRENDS

When corruption flourishes, people pay the price. Imagine you're a woman in the final stages of your university course, but your tutor demands sexual acts for passing your exam. Or your home is being destroyed by climate crisis-related flooding after the funds to adapt vital infrastructure were stolen by officials. Or you are a parent with a seriously ill child who isn't being given medical treatment because you don't have money to bribe the doctors.

This year's CPI ranks 182 countries and territories according to the levels of public-sector corruption perceived by experts and businesspeople. It relies on 13 independent data sources and uses a scale of zero to 100, where zero means that the country's public sector is seen as highly corrupt, and 100 as very clean. The results underline how most countries need to do far more to prevent and stop corruption.

This year, the highest ranked nation was Denmark (89), for the eighth time in a row, with a score of 89. Only a small group of 15 countries, mainly in Western Europe and Asia-Pacific, manage to get scores above 75. Of these, just five reach scores above 80. Meanwhile, over two thirds of countries (68 per cent) fall below 50, indicating serious corruption problems in most parts of the planet. At the bottom of the index, the countries scoring below 25 are mostly conflict-affected and highly repressive countries, such as Venezuela (10) and the lowest scorers, Somalia and South Sudan, which both score nine.

The CPI shows the stark contrast in controlling corruption between nations with strong, independent institutions, free and fair elections, and open civic space, and those ruled by repressive authoritarian regimes. Full democracies have a CPI average of 71, while flawed democracies average 47 and authoritarian regimes just 32. Although a very small number of non-democratic countries score relatively well compared to their regional peers, and are perceived as managing

SCORE CHANGES SINCE 2012⁷

31 COUNTRIES IMPROVED


50 COUNTRIES DECLINED

100 COUNTRIES STAYED THE SAME⁸

a limited range of corruption types successfully, they remain exceptions. In such contexts, anti-corruption efforts are typically centralised and top-down, and tend to be unsustainable. With no independent oversight or civic checks, they can be reversed overnight when political interests shift.⁹ The broader picture shows that democracy and strong, independent institutions are crucial for combatting corruption fully, effectively and sustainably.

AVERAGE CPI 2025 SCORE FOR DIFFERENT LEVELS OF CIVIC FREEDOMS*

Countries with more open civic space tend to have lower levels of corruption. As civic space becomes more restricted, average CPI scores steadily decline, suggesting that shrinking freedoms often coincide with weaker anti-corruption environments.



**Civics Monitor and Transparency International's 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index.*

Similarly, countries where civic space is guaranteed and protected tend to control corruption better. Those where the freedoms of expression, assembly and association are duly safeguarded are generally more resilient against corruption and score better on the CPI. However, countries where these freedoms are lacking are more likely to lose control of corruption: 36 of the 50 countries where the CPI scores have significantly declined have also seen a reduction in civic space.

CHANGING CORRUPTION LEVELS

A closer look at countries with significant changes in their CPI scores reveals clear trends that drive improvement and decline.

Two patterns stand out among countries whose CPI scores have fallen. The first is a set of sustained declines since 2012, where deterioration has been substantial and prolonged. This group includes Venezuela (10), Syria (15), Hungary (40) and South Sudan (9). Despite different contexts, these countries show long-term, structural erosion of integrity systems driven by democratic backsliding, institutional weakening and/or entrenched patronage networks. This has been accelerated by conflict in some cases. Their declines are steep, persistent and hard to reverse because corruption becomes systemic and deeply ingrained in both political and administrative systems.

In Venezuela, leaders have stripped oversight institutions of almost all independence. They have also been using state-owned companies for personal profit, including the state-owned oil giant, PDVSA, which has lost over ten billion dollars to a currency exchange scheme and a crypto scheme.¹⁰ In South Sudan, corruption worsened during the civil war of the 2010s, as leaders routinely used state funds to buy loyalty from militias and to enrich themselves.¹¹ Promised public financial management reforms under a 2018 peace deal failed to materialise and South Sudanese officials have continued to divert resources. Their corruption has also become more sophisticated making use of off-budget schemes and politically connected contracts.¹² The Hungarian government has systemically weakened rule-of-law, civic space and


electoral integrity for over 10 years. This has enabled impunity for channelling billions – including from European Union (EU) funds – to groups of cronies through dirty public contracting and other methods.^{13, 14}

The second pattern is more recent and concentrated among higher-scoring countries. While many of these nations still rank near the top of the index, they have slipped noticeably from their initial baselines. This group includes countries like the United States (64), Canada (75), the United Kingdom (70), France (66), Sweden (80), New Zealand (81) and Chile (63). In many of these countries, corruption risks have increased because independent checks and balances have been weakened, key gaps in anti-corruption legislation have not been addressed, and enforcement has been scaled back. Several have also experienced strains to their democracies, including political polarisation and the growing influence of private money on decision making. This trend shows that even robust systems can be vulnerable to integrity risks.

At many points in the last decade, the United Kingdom saw codes of conduct repeatedly broken or undermined, alongside persistent problems around revolving doors, lobbying transparency and enforcement of anti-corruption rules.¹⁵ High-profile scandals included COVID-19 procurement for personal protective equipment, where people close to power were able to secure lucrative supplier contracts.¹⁶

REGIONAL OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION

Number of countries that improved or declined in each region since 2012 plus average CPI 2025 scores.



Corruption in the political culture of France continues to be a concern. A series of high-profile scandals – from Nicolas Sarkozy’s conviction for illegal campaign financing,¹⁷ to the embezzlement of EU funds by Rassemblement National party,¹⁸ to the government facing criticism for its handling of a mineral water scandal involving Nestlé¹⁹ are reinforcing concerns about whether public authorities have both the capacity and the political will to translate ambitious anti-corruption measures, such as those on lobbying and political financing, from paper into effective practice.

On the positive side, two models of progress emerge. One is long-term gains from lower starting scores, where countries have climbed from the bottom toward the middle of the CPI ranking. This group includes Albania (39), Angola (32), Cote d’Ivoire (43), Laos (34), Senegal (46), Ukraine (36) and Uzbekistan (31). Their progress is driven by long-term efforts from political leaders and regulators, whether through broad legal

and institutional reforms in more open settings or narrow state-led control campaigns in more restricted ones. However, these narrow, top-down anti-corruption efforts are intrinsically fragile.²⁰ Strong, free civil society organisations have also maintained and protected the paths to good governance reforms that many of these countries have taken. In Ukraine, for example, civil society mobilisation helped protect strong anti-corruption institutions as they came under pressure in 2025 so that they could continue to work independently.

Ukraine has seen a challenging year marked by major procurement and defence-sector scandals,²¹ pointing to continued high-level corruption risks. At the same time, the fact that these and many other scandals are being uncovered and leading to convictions shows that Ukraine’s new anti-corruption architecture is making a difference.²² The challenge now is to move from reactive clean-ups after each scandal to structural reforms that close loopholes and better protect public resources.

The second pattern of improvement is long-term gains in countries that started with mid-to-high CPI scores. A persistent consolidation of anti-corruption efforts has driven progress in countries like Estonia (76), South Korea (63), Bhutan (71) and Seychelles (68). The long-term improvements in the democratic countries reflect sustained momentum with reforms, strengthened oversight institutions and broad political consensus in favour of clean governance. This has often been supported by digitalisation of public services, professionalisation of the civil service, and integration of regional and global governance standards and frameworks.

Bhutan has consistently strengthened its anti-corruption framework for more than 15 years, with an empowered anti-corruption agency that has driven prevention as well as enforcement. The country has complemented this with other independent watchdogs, such as an auditing authority, and more transparent systems, such as its e-procurement platform.

In the last 10 years, South Korea has brought in tougher rules of conduct for public servants and stronger institutional safeguards, such as whistleblower protection and enhanced transparency around procurement.

In short, the improvements and declines on the CPI tell various stories. Some declines come from stress to democratic integrity at high levels, while others reflect deep institutional breakdown. Similarly, some improvements can be linked to broader democratic, rights-based reforms that strengthen civic space, media freedom, transparency and access to information. Other increases in score are the product of authoritarian leaders' control campaigns in environments that have limited freedoms and rights. These might be effective against some types of corruption, such as bribery, but without independent courts, free media or space for critical voices, these gains are fragile and vulnerable to reversal and selective enforcement.

KEY DRIVERS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION

Corruption can manifest in all aspects of public life: in parliaments, courtrooms, polling stations, newsrooms, local authorities, public hospitals and schools. When decision makers act corruptly, it shapes who can get justice, whose voice is considered when designing policies, which stories are told or silenced, and who can access basic public services like health and education. When decisions are influenced by money or personal ties, the state is no longer an upholder of rights, but a system that must be navigated or pleaded with to secure rights that should be guaranteed by law.

The consequences of corruption are widespread across society, and interact with other governance pressures to multiply risks and erode public trust. Corruption's effects are especially visible and damaging in four key areas: justice and the rule of law, democracy and political integrity, civic space and media freedom, and public services and inequality. In each of these domains, corrupt behaviour does more than divert resources or break rules: it reshapes incentives and widens power imbalances.

Justice and rule of law

Corruption undermines justice from within.

When politicians or businesses interfere with the selection of judges and prosecutors, and the decisions these officials make, the law often protects the well-connected, rather than the public. Justice systems that are independent and adequately resourced are often associated with lower corruption risks.²³ Conversely, politicised or under-resourced institutions are linked with uneven enforcement and greater impunity.²⁴ In such contexts, case assignment may be manipulated, investigations may stall and charges can be misplaced.²⁵ Judges and prosecutors can also face pressure in sensitive matters – if they have not


lost their independence or autonomy already. When justice is for sale, written laws become meaningless and impunity flourishes.

Corruption is not a victimless crime. When those with power abuse it, they hurt real people as well as states. In corruption cases, individuals and communities in most countries don't have access to justice, either directly or through representation by civil society organisations.²⁶ They are therefore unable to get remedies for the harm caused by corruption, particularly if public prosecutors or state attorneys have limited resources or are captured.

Barriers to access to justice can also heighten corruption risks. Even where strong legal guarantees exist, high costs, distance, backlogs and limited legal aid make remedies hard to obtain, especially for low-income and vulnerable communities. In these conditions, people may feel pushed toward intermediaries and informal payments, allowing court officials wider discretion over scheduling, filings and access to information.²⁷ As fair and timely justice becomes harder to secure, confidence in the rule of law is eroded and willingness to report or pursue complaints declines. The perceived costs of wrongdoing also fall, which can further incentivise corruption.

CORRUPTION AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE*

In countries with lower levels of corruption, people generally report being better able to access and afford justice. While there are exceptions, the overall pattern suggests that lower levels of corruption go hand-in-hand with justice systems that are more accessible and affordable for people.



*Source: World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index 2025 and Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2025.

SEYCHELLES

With a 16-point improvement on the CPI since 2012, Seychelles (68) has shown how a stronger justice system can make a significant difference in the fight against corruption. The country has been prosecuting an increasing number of corruption cases, including high-profile ones, and has improved how law enforcement agencies share information. It has also brought in various legal reforms to enhance enforcement, particularly through the establishment and strengthening of its anti-corruption agency. However, it must further reform various aspects of the public sector. These include justice, as highlighted by ongoing delays with investigating and prosecuting a case involving the alleged laundering of US\$50 million.²⁸

Democracy, political integrity and state capture

Corruption and democratic decline reinforce one another.


When competition for power is weakened and influence over policy is opaque, public authority can be seized by private interests.²⁹ Strong checks and balances that hold power accountable are therefore crucial to uphold democracy and prevent corruption. These include parliaments that scrutinise budgets,³⁰ independent courts that can review government decisions,³¹ audit institutions with access to data,³² and election bodies that enforce fair rules.³³ When these guardrails are constrained, people’s voices can be drowned out by moneyed interests and those with better political connections. This provides more opportunities for corrupt acts, and pushes policies away from the common good.

Our research suggests that countries with stronger oversight institutions and free and fair elections tend to show greater resilience against corruption risks. In particular, transparency and caps on who funds political parties and how much is spent on election campaigns are needed to ensure that democracy is protected from undue influence.³⁴ Alongside this, transparency about who is lobbying politicians is crucial to protect against conflicts of interest holding back policymaking in the public interest.

When leaders and influential cronies can evade checks and balances, as well as disable and weaponise state institutions and policies to serve their interests, it also opens the doors to plundering of state resources. The expansion of high-level abuse of power – known as “grand corruption”³⁵ – into extensive capture of states may come swiftly. It can also be associated with a period of deterioration of public administration, justice institutions and democratic processes, and increased suppression of human rights.³⁶ These processes usually have international dimensions, including cross-border laundering of misappropriated assets.³⁷

AVERAGE CPI 2025 SCORE FOR DIFFERENT LEVELS OF TRANSPARENCY IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Greater transparency of campaign donations is associated with lower levels of corruption.



*Source: VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY (V-DEM) 2024 “DISCLOSURE OF CAMPAIGN DONATIONS” and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2025.

UNITED STATES

The United States (64) political climate has been deteriorating for more than a decade, and this year the country dropped to its lowest-ever CPI score. While the data has yet to fully reflect developments in 2025, the use of public office to target and restrict independent voices such as NGOs and journalists, the normalisation of conflicted and transactional politics,³⁸ the politicisation of prosecutorial decision making,³⁹ and actions that undermine judicial independence,⁴⁰ among many others, all send a dangerous signal that corrupt practices are acceptable.

FRANCE

The conviction of former French President Nicolas Sarkozy is a rare but important example of high-level accountability for shortcomings in political integrity in Europe. In September 2025, a Paris court sentenced him to five years in prison for criminal conspiracy related to alleged millions of euros of illicit funds from the late Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. An appeal trial is due to begin in March 2026. In November 2025, another conviction and one-year prison sentence for illegal financing of his 2012 re-election effort were upheld. He was found guilty of spending nearly twice the legal campaign limit.^{41, 42, 43}

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

While the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (69) has some effective guards against public sector corruption, like active enforcement and a few strong oversight bodies, issues relating to democracy are creating serious corruption risks. The authoritarian government's top-down approach to anti-corruption is unsustainable. Also, people with political connections can influence both policy and the allocation of contracts, making use of opacity around government decisions. What is more, the UAE's role as a weakly regulated financial hub facilitates abuse of power abroad – grand corruption perpetrators and their accomplices use it to invest their stolen wealth overseas and flee from justice. Numerous controversial people – like Isabel dos Santos, who has long been accused by Angolan authorities of misappropriating state assets while her father was president – have made use of the country.⁴⁴

Civic space and media freedom

Open civic space and an independent media underpin accountability.

Where people can freely meet, organise themselves, speak up to demand change from their leaders and get public authorities to provide information, civil society and journalists can make important contributions to the fight against corruption.⁴⁵ For example, they can identify red flags in procurement processes, corruption risks in service delivery and cases of illicit enrichment. Through investigative reporting, freedom of information requests, community monitoring and public-interest litigation, they can contribute to enforcement and accountability.⁴⁶ Scrutiny of government action by civil society and the press gives voters the information they need to sanction corruption and reward integrity at the ballot box.

These watchdog functions are weakened when civic space is narrowed through politicised interference in NGO operations; restrictive NGO laws or lawsuits aimed at intimidating or silencing the media and civil society; and surveillance, censorship or partisan allocation of state advertising to pro-government media.⁴⁷ Exposure becomes riskier and self-censorship more likely, and opportunities for wrongdoing may expand.

When journalists are attacked or killed for investigating corruption, power cannot be held to account effectively and corruption tends to worsen. Since 2012, in non-conflict zones worldwide, 829 journalists have been murdered. One hundred and fifty were killed while covering corruption-related stories, five of them in 2025. These include Turki al-Jasser, who was executed by the Saudi authorities after seven years in detention,⁴⁸ and Gastón Medina, who was shot outside his house in Peru.⁴⁹


Over 90 per cent of these killings happened in countries with a CPI score lower than 50,⁵⁰ including in Brazil, India, Mexico, Pakistan and Iraq, which are particularly dangerous for journalists reporting on corruption.

GEORGIA

Georgia (50) illustrates how democratic backsliding directly fuels corruption risks. The ruling party has introduced a so-called “foreign agents” law and a grants law, both anti-democratic measures that criminalise legitimate NGO activity and brand independent voices as foreign agents. It has also intensified its campaign against dissent through politically motivated prosecutions, media restrictions, freezing NGO bank accounts, and violent crackdowns on protesters and journalists. Following disputed 2024 elections and the suspension of EU integration talks, international observers now describe Georgia as undergoing an authoritarian turn, with proposals to ban opposition parties and deepen political control over the civil service, police and judiciary. This is creating severely increased corruption risks and damaging Georgia’s society as a whole.⁵¹

CORRUPTION AND MURDER OF JOURNALISTS*

Almost all of the 150 murders of journalists covering corruption-related stories in non-conflict zones since 2012 happened in countries with high corruption levels.



*Source: Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index.

Public services and inequality

Corruption in the management of public funds hinders people’s ability to access key services and affects everyday life.

When funds are diverted, contracts inflated or access to services is dependent on unofficial payments, people can be left without essentials such as health care, schooling, water, electricity and housing. Evidence links corruption risks with lower quality and reliability of services.⁵²

The impact on poorer households is especially stark. Unofficial fees and favouritism act like a regressive tax, taking a larger share of low incomes, which can deter the poorest from seeking care or keeping children in school.⁵³ Marginalised groups may be excluded from programmes they are entitled to, and where access seems to depend on connections rather than rights, inequality can widen and perceptions of unfairness deepen.⁵⁴

When the officials and creditors in charge of negotiating and managing sovereign debt act corruptly, they severely increase the risk of fiscal crisis and drive inequalities. Hiding debt from the public, taking bribes to accept unfavourable borrowing terms, and unlawfully appropriating borrowed funds put the welfare of many people at

risk. These acts leave governments with extremely difficult choices between servicing their debt or investing in critical sectors like health, education and climate action.⁵⁵


Strengthening integrity in the mobilisation, allocation and expenditure of public funds is vital. It helps make economies stable and ensure services work effectively, on the basis of need and entitlement, not connections or extra payments.

NEPAL

In September 2025, Gen-Z-led protests toppled the Nepalese (34) government. Anger had long been growing about perceived corruption and nepotism by political elites and their families, and the widespread inequality and economic instability it caused. The uprising was sparked by restrictions on freedom of expression, but grew in intensity as authorities suppressed protest with force rather than addressing integrity problems and trying to bring corruption perpetrators to justice. Within eight days, a new government was formed, showing how quickly leaders can go from abusing power to losing it.

AVERAGE CPI 2025 SCORE FOR DIFFERENT LEVELS OF ESSENTIAL HEALTH SERVICES*

Countries with higher CPI scores tend to provide better quality and coverage of essential health services. In these countries, health care is more accessible and available to the population.



*World Health Organization's UHC Service Coverage Index (2021) and Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2025.

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